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INTRODUCTION 
A cornerstone of American jurisprudence is the presumption that any per-
son accused of a crime is innocent until proven guilty.1 Throughout this na-
tion’s history, the presumption of innocence has developed in many aspects of 
the criminal justice system—including the right to be free from unjustifiable 
restraint.2 This freedom is one with deep roots in English common law and 
American history, yet presents a modern debate over whether this protection 
extends beyond the presence of a jury.3 In Deck v. Missouri, the Supreme Court 
first addressed the issue of whether an individual has the right to be free from 
unjustifiable restraint in the presence of a jury during sentencing and estab-
lished three overarching principles that guide courts today.4 First, visible shack-
ling undercuts the presumption of innocence and unduly prejudices the jury be-
cause it indicates that the individual should be separated from the public.5 
Second, shackling diminishes an individual’s right to effective assistance of 
counsel.6 Third, shackling an individual disrupts the dignity and public percep-
tion of the court.7 
Until recently, all circuits interpreting the issue of prejudicial restraint had 
held that the Deck presumptions applied only to proceedings where the jury 
was present.8 That continuity between the circuits changed when the en banc 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held in United States v. Sanchez-Gomez that the 
Deck presumptions compel courts to individually evaluate whether restraint is 
appropriate—regardless of the presence of a jury.9 The United States Supreme 
Court granted certiorari, but because the defendants ultimately lacked standing 
to challenge the issue, the Supreme Court left the restraint question unan-
swered.10 
 
1  See, e.g., Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 483 (1978) (citing Coffin v. United States, 
156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895)). 
2  Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 630 (2005); Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 567–68 
(1986). 
3  Compare United States v. Sanchez-Gomez, 859 F.3d 649, 662 (9th Cir. 2017) (en banc), 
vacated, 138 S. Ct. 1532 (2018), with United States v. LaFond, 783 F.3d 1216, 1225 (11th 
Cir. 2015). 
4  Deck, 544 U.S. at 630. 
5  Id. 
6  Id. at 631. 
7  Id. 
8  See, e.g., LaFond, 783 F.3d at 1225; United States v. Zuber, 118 F.3d 101, 104 (2d Cir. 
1997). 
9  United States v. Sanchez-Gomez, 859 F.3d 649, 661 (9th Cir. 2017) (en banc), vacated, 
138 S. Ct. 1532 (2018). 
10  United States v. Sanchez-Gomez, 138 S. Ct. 1532, 1542 (2018). For a brief discussion 
regarding the justiciability issue, see infra Section III.E. 
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This Note contributes to the broader discussion of restraint in non-jury pro-
ceedings and the delicate balance between an individual’s liberties and the need 
for safety and security in the courtroom. Part I of this Note will trace the histor-
ical lineage of the trend toward less shackling throughout the English common 
law courts and the early American approaches to restraint. Part II will explain 
modern developments and protections against restraint while balancing the se-
rious security concerns that modern courts face. Part III of this Note will ad-
dress the Ninth Circuit’s split from its sister circuits and the Supreme Court’s 
response. Finally, Part IV of this Note will analyze the judicial response to this 
split following Sanchez-Gomez and offer insight into the appropriate level of 
judicial scrutiny to apply in these situations, accounting for various factors and 
safety concerns. This Note considers the different approaches that circuits have 
adopted, and will recommend that courts apply a middle-ground approach that 
follows the core of Sanchez-Gomez, but places more significant weight upon 
the type of proceeding and location of the court in which the proceeding takes 
place. These considerations are necessary to provide protections for proceed-
ings that take place in smaller or less-equipped courtrooms, where potential un-
derstaffing issues present security concerns. 
I. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT 
While the various methods and instruments of restraint have significantly 
changed since the Eighteenth Century in England, reluctance toward restraint 
has been a unifying theme throughout this development.11 This hesitancy, how-
ever, has never been unlimited, and courts have generally recognized the need 
for security in court proceedings.12 This Part of the Note will trace the history 
of restraint through the common law courts in England and early American 
courts that took a nearly identical approach to restraint. 
A. The Common Law Background Against Unjustified Restraint 
English common law courts established an early iteration of the presump-
tion against restraint in arraignment proceedings, highlighting a deep-rooted 
right against unjustifiable restraint.13 A serious concern historically rooted in 
 
11  See Deck, 544 U.S. at 638–39 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“This concern was understanda-
ble, for the irons of that period were heavy and painful. In fact, leather strips often lined the 
irons to prevent them from rubbing away a defendant’s skin.”) (citing T. GROSS, MANACLES 
OF THE WORLD: A COLLECTOR’S GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL HANDCUFFS, LEG IRONS AND 
OTHER MISCELLANEOUS SHACKLES AND RESTRAINTS 25 (1997)). But see Brief for Nat’l 
Ass’n of Fed. Defs. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 8, United States v. 
Sanchez-Gomez, 138 S. Ct. 1532 (2018) (No. 17-312), 2018 WL 1156630 at *8 (“These tes-
timonies, as well as extensive medical evidence, belie the notion that modern restraints may 
be categorically distinguished from the restraints of an earlier era with respect to the pain 
and injury they may cause.”). 
12  See infra Section I.A. 
13  See, e.g., 2 MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 219 (Philadelph-
ia, Robert H. Small 1847) (“The prisoner, tho under an indictment of the highest crime, must 
be brought to the bar without irons, and all manner of shackles or bonds.”). But see id. (“But 
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the common law doctrine was that restraint inflicted unnecessary pain upon in-
dividuals brought before the court.14 This pain—commenters noted—distracted 
individuals and affected their ability to properly and effectively defend them-
selves.15 In addition to the difficulty that restraint posed on individuals to de-
fend themselves, courts were also cognizant of protecting an individual’s digni-
ty.16 These comments cautioned against any restraint that would cast a sense of 
shame upon the defendant.17 Beyond the concern of an individual’s dignity, 
English common law also focused on the “dignity and decorum of the judicial 
process.”18 
As courts and common law developed, so too did the limitation on unjusti-
fiable restraint. It became increasingly clear that courts would not restrain a de-
fendant at the time of his arraignment unless that defendant was likely to es-
cape.19 Matthew Hale detailed that even in cases where individuals were 
charged with the highest-level offense, they were to be brought in front of the 
court without restraint, unless it was clear there was a danger that the defendant 
would escape.20 Hale noted that if a defendant was brought into the court in re-
straints, the court would remove the restraints until the defendant was ultimate-
ly convicted of the crime.21 These comments indicate that there was a strong 
presumption toward limiting restraint unless it was ultimately necessary for se-
curity purposes. 
While English common law distinguished between arraignments and trials, 
the presumption against restraint still applied regardless of the type of proceed-
ing.22 Often cited as an example of this distinction is the case and trial of Chris-
 
note, at this day they usually come with their shackles upon their legs, for fear of an escape, 
but stand at the bar unbound, till they receive judgment.”). 
14  3 EDWARDO COKE, INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 34 (London, W. Clarke & Sons 
1809). 
15  Id. (“[S]o that their pain shall not take away any manner of reason, nor them constrain to 
answer, but at their free will.”). 
16  2 WILLIAM HAWKINS & JOHN CURWOOD, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 434 
(London, S. Sweet, 8th ed. 1824). 
17  Id. (citations omitted) (“[E]very person . . . ought not to be brought to the bar in a contu-
melious manner; as with his [] hands tied together, or any other mark of ignominy and re-
proach; nor even with fetters on [] his feet . . .”). 
18  David E. Westman, Note, Handling the Problem Criminal Defendant in the Courtroom: 
The Use of Physical Restraints and Expulsion in the Modern Era, 2 SAN DIEGO JUST. J. 507, 
510 (1994). 
19  See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 317 (Oxford, 
Clarendon Press, 4th ed. 1770); see also COKE, supra note 14, at 34 (“If felons come in 
judgement to answer . . . they shall be out of irons, and all manner of bonds, so that their 
pain shall not take away any manner of reason, nor them constrain to answer, but at their free 
will.”). 
20  HALE, supra note 13, at 219. 
21  Id. 
22  Id. at 219 n.(b). As evidenced by the dissents in United States v. Sanchez-Gomez, and 
Deck v. Missouri, there is a dispute over this history. See infra Section I.A. Justice Thomas, 
in his dissent in Deck, stated that the rule these courts developed was limited to “ensure[] 
that a defendant was not so distracted by physical pain during his trial that he could not de-
fend himself,” not a “presumption of innocence, the right to counsel, concerns about deco-
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topher Layer.23 Layer was indicted for high-treason for “imagining the [d]eath 
of the King.”24 During arraignment, Layer pleaded for the court to remove his 
shackles, arguing that the restraint prevented him from effectively defending 
himself due to the great inconvenience and pain.25 The Government argued that 
Layer not only previously attempted to escape, but actually succeeded in escap-
ing, requiring shackles to reduce the risk that he would escape again.26 The 
court ultimately found that restraint was justified because of Layer’s escape 
risk.27 This individualized assessment highlights that although Layer’s objec-
tions were unsuccessful, it was uncommon to restrain an individual during an 
arraignment unless it was absolutely necessary to prevent that defendant from 
escaping.28 
There is however a point of contention between jurists about whether the 
common law courts drew a distinction between arraignment and trial.29 Nota-
bly, Justice Clarence Thomas interpreted Christopher Layer’s case and con-
cluded that the only reason the courts required a defendant to be brought to the 
bar for trial without shackles was because the pain of restraints was so signifi-
cant that it distracted an individual from effectively defending himself.30 Under 
Justice Thomas’s reading of the case, the common law prohibited restraint at 
arraignment because the defendant “would play the main role in defending 
himself.”31 Judge Sandra Ikuta of the Ninth Circuit similarly read Layer’s case, 
explaining, “the concern was not with escape, but with the practicalities of re-
moving restraints for a hearing of limited purpose and duration.”32 
 
rum, or accuracy in decisionmaking.” Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 638 (2005) (Thomas, 
J., dissenting); see also United States v. Sanchez-Gomez, 859 F.3d 649, 679 (9th Cir. 2017) 
(en banc) (Ikuta, J., dissenting) (“[T]he concern was not with escape, but with the practicali-
ties of removing restraints for a hearing of limited purpose and duration.”), vacated, 138 S. 
Ct. 1532 (2018). 
23  See, e.g., Deck, 544 U.S. at 626; United States v. Henderson, 915 F.3d 1127, 1138 (7th 
Cir. 2019) (Hamilton, J., dissenting). 
24  The Trial of Christopher Layer, Esq; at the King’s-Bench for High-Treason, Nov. 21. 
1722, in 2 A COLLECTION OF THE MOST REMARKABLE TRIALS OF PERSONS FOR HIGH-
TREASON, MURDER, RAPES, HERESY, BIGAMY, BURGLARY; AND OTHER CRIMES AND 
MISDEMEANORS 1 (London, T. Read 1735). 
25  Id. at 3 (“I hope I shall have these [c]hains taken off, that I may have the free [u]se of that 
[r]eason and [u]nderstanding which God hath given me . . . I hope these [c]hains shall be 
taken off in the first [p]lace, and then I hope I shall have a fair and a tender [t]rial.”). 
26  Id. at 3–4. 
27  Id. at 5 (“I don’t think a [m]an charged with [h]igh-[t]reason of this [n]ature, can be said 
justly to be too well guarded, especially if it be true that what hath been suggested, that he 
hath endeavored to make is [e]scape . . .”). 
28  See United States v. Sanchez-Gomez, 859 F.3d 649, 664 (9th Cir. 2017) (en banc), vacat-
ed, 138 S. Ct. 1532 (2018). But see infra notes 29–32 and accompanying text. 
29  See, e.g., Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 641 n.3 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting); 
Sanchez-Gomez, 859 F.3d at 679 (Ikuta, J., dissenting). 
30  Deck, 544 U.S. at 638 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
31  Id. at 639–40 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
32  Sanchez-Gomez, 859 F.3d at 679 (Ikuta, J., dissenting). 
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Although there is some dispute over exactly what type of proceedings this 
rule applied to, it is evident from the history of the common law jurisprudence 
that there has always been tension between, and a balancing of, competing se-
curity and due process interests.33 These developments set the stage for early 
American courts, and ultimately modern courts, to require a court to justify its 
restraint of an individual to protect that individual’s liberty. 
B. Early American Jurisprudence and the Development of the Presumption 
Against Restraint 
As with many other developments in the American legal system, early 
courts in the United States followed the English common law approach to re-
straint.34 In the first reported American case on the issue of restraint during tri-
al, the California Supreme Court held that a court may only use restraint where 
there is “evident necessity.”35 The court, closely following much of the English 
common law doctrine, held that absent a showing that it was absolutely neces-
sary to restrain a defendant, any court action that imposed more restraint than 
necessary violated a defendant’s constitutional rights.36 
Several other courts in early American history also relied upon this rule 
and held that criminal defendants had a fundamental right to be free from un-
warranted restraint in the courtroom during the guilt phase.37 Courts continually 
emphasized that a court could only impose restraint upon an individual when it 
was “absolutely necessary.”38 Serious security concerns—such as a defendant 
who stated he intended to escape, threatened others, and was found with a 
weapon—did not inhibit a court from restraining individuals.39 While some 
states afforded significantly higher deference to trial courts in determining the 
appropriate level of restraint, as courts in the United States developed, a majori-
ty of states adopted the common law approach away from shackling.40 
 
33  See supra Part I. 
34  1 JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, NEW CRIMINAL PROCEDURE OR NEW COMMENTARIES ON THE 
LAW OF PLEADING AND EVIDENCE AND THE PRACTICE IN CRIMINAL CASES 573, § 955 (Chica-
go, T. H. Flood & Co., 4th ed. 1895) (“Our American courts adhere pretty closely to this 
doctrine, yet deem that in extreme and exceptional cases, where the safe custody of the pris-
oner and the peace of the tribunal imperatively demand, the manacles may be retained.”). 
35  People v. Harrington, 42 Cal. 165, 168 (1871). 
36  Id. 
37  See, e.g., Parker v. Territory, 52 P. 361, 363 (Ariz. 1898); State v. Kring, 64 Mo. 591, 592 
(1877); State v. McKay, 165 P.2d 389, 405 (Nev. 1946). 
38  Westman, supra note 18, at 510. 
39  Id. (citing People v. Kimball, 55 P.2d 483, 484 (1936)). 
40  Tara J. Mondelli, Note, Deck v. Missouri: Assessing the Shackling of Defendants During 
the Penalty Phase of Trials, 15 WIDENER L.J. 785, 787 (2006). States like Alabama, New 
Mexico, and Mississippi all varied on how much deference they would afford the trial courts. 
See Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 643–44 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting). Upon review, 
New Mexico allowed a court to presume that there was a legitimate reason for shackling an 
individual in the trial court if the record was silent on the issue. Territory v. Kelly, 2 N.M. 
292, 305 (1882). Alabama reflected the opposite end of the spectrum and even “went so far 
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II. MODERN DEVELOPMENT 
As the law began to develop in the federal court system, English common 
law remained present in many judicial opinions.41 And while several courts 
have upheld the presumption against restraint in the context of various jury 
proceedings, more recently, some have begun to move away from the presump-
tion against unwarranted restraint in non-jury contexts. Methods of restraint 
have changed significantly, and as courts have evolved, so too have the security 
concerns that plague them.42 This Part will identify the application and devel-
opment of the presumption against unwarranted restraint in the sentencing 
phase of the trial and will explain the Second and Eleventh Circuits’ hesitancy 
to apply this law beyond the presence of the jury.43 
A. The Second Circuit 
Before the Supreme Court decided the issue of restraint in jury proceed-
ings, the Second Circuit in United States v. Zuber declined to apply the law that 
required “an independent, judicial evaluation of the need to restrain a party in 
court” to non-jury proceedings.44 In Zuber, the defendant pled guilty to one 
count of cocaine distribution and was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 
151 months.45 The defendant was brought before the court in restraints based 
on a recommendation from the U.S. Marshals Service.46 During his sentencing 
hearing, the defendant requested that the court modify his restraints because his 
appearance before the judge in restraints was “not exactly a good way to pre-
sent oneself to the sentencing [c]ourt.”47 The judge denied the defendant’s re-
quest because the sentence determination occurred outside the presence of the 
jury.48 
The defendant appealed his sentence based on the district court’s deference 
to the U.S. Marshals’ recommendation, arguing that Second Circuit precedent 
required the district court to make an individualized assessment, on the record, 
of why the court chose to restrain him.49 The court rejected Zuber’s argument 
 
as to bar any appeal from the trial court’s decision to restrain the defendant.” Deck, 544 U.S. 
at 644 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also Faire v. State, 58 Ala. 74, 81 (1877). 
41  See, e.g., Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 568 (1986); Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 
344 (1970). 
42  See Lee Sinclair & Timothy F. Fautsko, Court Security on a Beer Budget, A.B.A. (Nov. 
1, 2014), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/judicial/publications/judges_journal/ 
2014/fall/court_security_on_a_beer_budget/ [https://perma.cc/3RM5-7HKX]. 
43  Although the Third Circuit recently addressed this split in United States v. Ayala, 917 
F.3d 752 (3d Cir. 2019), this Part of the Note will only analyze the pre-Sanchez-Gomez ap-
proaches to restraint. The Third Circuit’s opinion is discussed infra Part IV. 
44  United States v. Zuber, 118 F.3d 101, 104 (2d Cir. 1997). 
45  Id. at 102–03. 
46  Id. at 103. 
47  Id. 
48  See id. at 103 n.1. 
49  Id. at 103. 
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holding that because judges are not likely to be prejudiced by seeing a defend-
ant in restraints, courts should be able to defer to the U.S. Marshals Service.50 
Although juror bias is not the only reason behind restricting the use of restraints 
in jury proceedings, it is one of the most important concerns; thus, the court 
held that there was no need for the district court to engage in an individualized 
assessment on the record where a defendant would not be shackled in a jury’s 
presence.51 As the Ninth Circuit’s majority noted in Sanchez-Gomez, this case 
did not rule out the possibility of an individual asserting a liberty interest in this 
scenario, but rather focused solely on whether shackling presents an “inherent 
prejudice.”52 
B. The United States Supreme Court 
Although many cases identified that the presumption of innocence applied 
during the guilt phase, none applied this presumption outside of this con-
text53—until Deck v. Missouri.54 There, the United States Supreme Court fur-
ther developed restraint jurisprudence and held that an individual had the right 
to be brought before the court unrestrained during the penalty phase of a capital 
trial, unless the government could provide a sufficient and individualized justi-
fication for restraint.55 A Missouri jury convicted Carman Deck of murder and 
robbery and sentenced him to death.56 Deck successfully appealed his sentence 
to the Missouri Supreme Court based on ineffective assistance of counsel and 
was granted a new penalty phase trial.57 During his new sentencing hearing, 
Deck was brought into court in “leg irons, handcuffs, and a belly chain.”58 The 
trial judge overruled numerous objections to Deck’s restraint because he had 
already been convicted of the crime and the only issue was his sentence.59 
“Deck was again sentenced to death.”60 
The United States Supreme Court overturned Deck’s sentence in a seven to 
two decision,61 holding that the lower court’s use of shackles during the penalty 
phase violated clearly established principles central to the U.S. judicial sys-
 
50  Id. at 104. 
51  See id. 
52  United States v. Sanchez-Gomez, 859 F.3d 649, 661 n.8 (9th Cir. 2017) (en banc), vacat-
ed, 138 S. Ct. 1532 (2018). 
53  Brandon Dickerson, Case Note, Bidding Farewell to the Ball and Chain: The United 
States Supreme Court Unconvincingly Prohibits Shackling in the Penalty Phase in Deck v. 
Missouri, 39 CREIGHTON L. REV. 741, 741 (2006). 
54  Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 630 (2005); see also Dickerson, supra note 53, at 742. 
55  Deck, 544 U.S. at 624. 
56  Id. at 624–25. 
57  Deck v. State, 68 S.W.3d 418, 422 (Mo. 2002) (en banc). 
58  Deck, 544 U.S. at 625. 
59  Id. 
60  Id. 
61  Id. at 623 (Breyer, J., wrote the opinion of the Court, joined by Rehnquist, C.J., Stevens, 
O’Connor, Kennedy, Souter, and Ginsburg, JJ. Thomas, J., authored a dissenting opinion 
that Scalia, J., joined). 
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tem.62 The Court held that an individual’s right to due process under the Fifth 
and Fourteenth Amendments extended to the right to be free from restraint in 
the presence of a jury.63 To reach this conclusion, the Court first analyzed in-
structive cases from both American courts and English common law.64 The 
Court held that although today’s courts are less concerned with the pain that 
restraints impose, the case law made clear that three overarching principles de-
manded that a court show that the particular case necessitated restraint.65 
The first principle the Court identified was the presumption of innocence—
that any individual is innocent until proven guilty.66 This presumption—as out-
lined above—is one with many historical underpinnings.67 The Supreme Court 
held that visible shackling undercuts the presumption because it demonstrates 
to the jury that the defendant is an individual who must be separated from the 
public.68 The Court held that the use of restraint had the ability to “permeate the 
jury’s decision-making process.”69 
Second, the Court identified that the right to a meaningful defense is de-
pendent upon the defendant’s ability to freely communicate with his attorney.70 
The Supreme Court noted, for example, that a defendant would not be able to 
take the witness stand to defend himself if restrained.71 The Court again relied 
on cases from the English common law courts to explain that restraint increases 
the burden on a defendant so much that it may “ ‘confuse and embarrass’ de-
fendants’ ‘mental faculties,’ and thereby tend ‘materially to abridge and preju-
dicially affect his constitutional rights.’ ”72 
Third, the Court held that restraint during the sentencing phase negatively 
implicated the public perception of the judicial system generally.73 In this 
sense, the Court was concerned with how individuals perceived the purpose of 
courtrooms—that routine shackling has the potential to enforce a public opin-
ion that the court is a place of punishment, and not of justice.74 
This application of the presumption by the Court to the sentencing phase of 
a trial mirrored the trend throughout English and American courts. Only the 
least restrictive amount of restraint was permissible when a serious security 
 
62  See id. at 629. 
63  Id. 
64  Id. (“In light of this precedent, and of a lower court consensus disapproving routine 
shackling dating back to the 19th century, it is clear that this Court’s prior statements gave 
voice to a principle deeply embedded in the law.”). 
65  See id. at 630. 
66  Id. 
67  See supra Part I. 
68  Deck, 544 U.S. at 630. 
69  Mondelli, supra note 40, at 794. 
70  Deck, 544 U.S. at 631. 
71  Id. 
72  Id. (quoting People v. Harrington, 42 Cal. 165, 168 (1871)). 
73  Id. 
74  See id. 
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concern justified it.75 Although the Court was highly sensitive to the effects of 
shackling, it identified that trial courts still maintained “latitude in making indi-
vidualized security determinations.”76 This case balanced an individual’s liber-
ty interest with a court’s need to ensure safety during the proceeding. 
C. The Eleventh Circuit 
Years later, the Eleventh Circuit addressed the issue of shackling in a non-
jury setting in United States v. LaFond and refused to apply the Deck presump-
tions outside of a jury proceeding.77 In LaFond, a defendant was brought before 
the court and remained in hand restraints during his sentencing hearing.78 Dur-
ing the hearing, the defendant objected to his restraint, arguing that he had not 
exhibited any disruptive behavior in the courtroom to justify his continued re-
straint.79 The defendant also argued that keeping him shackled “ ‘offend[ed] the 
dignity of th[e] public courtroom.’ ”80 The district court overruled his objec-
tions and stated that because there was no jury present, he was not entitled to be 
free from restraint.81 The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the defendant’s sentence 
and held that the “rule against shackling pertains only to a jury trial.”82 
In holding that the presumption applied solely to jury trials, the Eleventh 
Circuit’s interpretation of Deck and the early English common law went further 
than the Zuber court in the Second Circuit.83 This court’s analysis narrowly in-
terpreted the Supreme Court’s holding in Deck and focused solely on whether 
the jury was present.84 Although this court limited the presumption against un-
warranted restraint without balancing a defendant’s individual liberties, this de-
cision is notable because it contributes to the dispute over whether jury pres-
ence is the only factor that makes restraint unjustifiable. It followed the Second 
Circuit and established continuity amongst the federal circuits that lasted until 
2017.85 
III. THE SANCHEZ-GOMEZ SPLIT 
In 2017, the Ninth Circuit split from the Second and Eleventh circuits and 
held that the principles established in Deck applied to all court proceedings—
 
75  See id. at 632. 
76  Id. 
77  United States v. LaFond, 783 F.3d 1216, 1225 (11th Cir. 2015). 
78  Id. at 1221. 
79  Id. 
80  Id. (alteration in original). 
81  Id. 
82  Id. at 1225. 
83  See id.; see also United States v. Sanchez-Gomez, 859 F.3d 649, 661 n.8 (9th Cir. 2017) 
(en banc), vacated, 138 S. Ct. 1532 (2018). 
84  LaFond, 783 F.3d at 1225. 
85  See id. at 1225 (citing United States v. Zuber, 118 F.3d 101, 102 (2d Cir. 1997)); see also 
infra Part III (discussing the split following the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Sanchez-Gomez). 
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regardless of jury presence.86 Although the rule announced in Sanchez-Gomez 
expanded the restraint jurisprudence beyond the guilt and sentencing phases of 
trial, the principles largely followed the same underlying rationale—an individ-
ual could only be restrained to the level it was absolutely necessary to protect 
the safety and security of the courtroom.87 
A. The District Court 
Following a series of dangerous incidents while bringing prisoners to the 
court, including a prisoner stabbing another prisoner, prisoner-made weapons 
found in holding cells, and an assault, U.S. Marshal Steven Stafford wrote a let-
ter to the Chief Judge of the United States District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of California requesting that he approve a district-wide restraint policy.88 
Stafford also cited the overwhelming number of prisoners that U.S. Marshals in 
the district were required to manage with an understaffed workforce.89 This dis-
trict-wide policy was consistent with the U.S. Marshals Service Policy Di-
rective that directed the Marshals to fully restrain all defendants in non-jury 
courtroom proceedings unless directed otherwise by the Magistrate or District 
Judge.90 Ultimately, Chief Judge Moskowitz deferred to the Marshals’ request, 
stating that the safety and security of the courtroom was outside the purview of 
the court’s expertise.91 Although his direction required the U.S. Marshals to ad-
here to any judicial decision to remove restraint upon objection by a party, this 
unfettered deference allowed the U.S. Marshals Service to create a district-wide 
policy that defaulted to fully restraining in-custody individuals for all non-jury 
proceedings.92 In effect on October 11, 2013,93 all but one judge in the district 
began to follow the policy and started fully restraining all in-custody defend-
ants during non-jury pretrial proceedings.94 
 
86  Sanchez-Gomez, 859 F.3d at 661. 
87  See id. at 662–666. 
88  See Joint Appendix at 76–77, United States v. Sanchez-Gomez, 138 S. Ct. 1532 (2018) 
(No. 17-312). 
89  See id. at 77 (detailing “the fact that the Marshals produced in-custody prisoners for 
44,426 court appearances in FY 2012 (an average of 178 per day), and the fact that the Mar-
shals are understaffed.”). 
90  See id. at 77; see also U.S. MARSHALS SERV., UNITED STATES MARSHALS SERVICE POLICY 
DIRECTIVES: PRISONER OPERATIONS 9.18(E)(3)(b) (2011) [hereinafter USMS POLICY 
DIRECTIVES]. 
91  Joint Appendix, supra note 88, at 79. 
92  Sanchez-Gomez, 859 F.3d at 653. 
93  United States v. Morales, Nos. 13mj3858 BLM (LAB), 13mj3882 JMA (LAB), 13mj3928 
BLM (LAB), 2013 WL 6145601, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 21, 2013), vacated sub nom. United 
States v. Sanchez-Gomez, 798 F.3d 1204 (9th Cir. 2015), on reh’g en banc 859 F.3d 649 
(9th Cir. 2017), vacated, 138 S. Ct. 1532 (2018). 
94  Sanchez-Gomez, 859 F.3d at 653 (“Only one district judge, Judge Marilyn Huff, opted out 
of the policy altogether. For the rest of the Southern District’s judges, the Marshals shackled 
all in-custody defendants at pretrial proceedings.”). 
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As defendants began objecting to the policy, a clear pattern of deference 
began to emerge.95 All defendants were fully restrained in accordance with the 
policy—regardless of their crime, or any physical incapacities.96 This meant 
that each defendant was presented in leg irons and handcuffs that were con-
nected to a chain around the individual’s waist.97 The policy directive also rec-
ommended the addition of security boxes and padlocks.98 One individual ap-
peared in front of the court in full restraints notwithstanding his fractured 
wrist.99 Another individual was brought in full restraints, even though she was 
in a wheelchair for her “dire and deteriorating health.”100 And although judges 
gave defendants the opportunity to object to their restraint, most objections 
were denied.101 Judges noted objections but clarified that they valued prompt 
resolution of the issue.102 
In three separate but related cases, four defendants objected to use of full 
restraints, but were each overruled by the magistrate judges.103 Jasmine Mo-
rales, Moises Patricio-Guzman, and Rene Sanchez-Gomez—all represented by 
the Federal Defenders of San Diego—consolidated their objections to their re-
straints and filed an emergency motion opposing the policy, but the district 
judge denied the motion.104 Applying a rational basis review of the defendants’ 
objections, Judge Larry Alan Burns stated that the restraint policy was not un-
constitutional because the policy did not mandate full restraint, but rather, de-
ferred to the judgment of the U.S. Marshals and still required the Marshals to 
remove arm and hand restraints during sentencing hearings and guilty pleas.105 
A fourth defendant, Mark Ring, was brought before the magistrate judge in 
full restraint even though he appeared in federal court twice before with no re-
straint and was crying largely due to the pain.106 Ring objected to his restraint 
but was similarly overruled by the magistrate judge.107 District Judge Michael 
Anello denied both Ring’s appeal to remove his restraint and his objections to 
 
95  See id. at 654. 
96  Id. 
97  See USMS POLICY DIRECTIVES, supra note 90, at 9.18(D)(2). 
98  See id. 
99  Sanchez-Gomez, 859 F.3d at 654. 
100  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
101  See id. 
102  See id. (“For the record, . . . every defendant that has come out is in th[e] exact same 
shackling; so [counsel doesn’t] have to repeat that every time. . . . The court noted her objec-
tion to the shackles and appreciate[d] [counsel] not taking anymore time with it.” (alteration 
in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
103  Id. 
104  United States v. Morales, Nos. 13mj3858 BLM (LAB), 13mj3882 JMA (LAB), 
13mj3928 BLM (LAB), 2013 WL 6145601, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 21, 2013), vacated sub 
nom. United States v. Sanchez-Gomez, 798 F.3d 1204 (9th Cir. 2015), on reh’g en banc 859 
F.3d 649 (9th Cir. 2017), vacated, 138 S. Ct. 1532 (2018). 
105  See id. 
106  Brief for Respondents at 5, United States v. Sanchez-Gomez, 138 S. Ct. 1532 (2018) 
(No. 17-312); see also Joint Appendix, supra note 88, at 743. 
107  Brief for Respondent, supra note 106, at 5. 
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the district-wide policy.108 These objections and subsequent denials were ex-
amples of a seemingly larger pattern.109 Defendants would appear in full re-
straint, their public defenders would object, and the judges would summarily 
deny the requests.110 
B. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals—Three-Judge Panel 
Failing to find relief in the district court, the four defendants appealed to 
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which initially vacated the district court’s 
ruling.111 On appeal, the defendants argued that the Southern District’s policy 
violated the Due Process Clause and the Ninth Circuit’s only other case on pre-
trial restraint.112 A three-judge panel agreed and vacated the district courts’ 
opinions.113 Judge Mary Schroeder, writing for the panel, disagreed with the 
government’s reading of United States v. Howard.114 There, the Ninth Circuit 
upheld a general restraint policy, that unlike the Southern District of California, 
was limited to only leg restraints.115 Beyond this distinction, the Howard policy 
was also limited to initial appearances before magistrate judges and required 
the government to show a more sufficient justification than Sanchez-Gomez.116 
Given this distinction and the court’s interpretation of Deck, the Sanchez-
Gomez court held that the government had to justify its restraint policy based 
on a showing of necessity.117 Unlike the Howard policy, which was necessary 
because the infrastructure of the courtroom was “ill-suited to accommodate 
modern security concerns,”118 the Southern District’s policy had no similar re-
quirement.119 
C. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals—En Banc Rehearing 
Shortly thereafter, the Ninth Circuit reheard the case en banc.120 Five judg-
es joined the majority121 and a sixth concurred in the judgment.122 The majority 
 
108  Joint Appendix, supra note 88, at 751. 
109  See United States v. Sanchez-Gomez, 859 F.3d 649, 654 (9th Cir. 2017) (en banc), va-
cated, 138 S. Ct. 1532 (2018). 
110  Id. (“The judges routinely denied the requests, relying on the Marshals Service’s general 
security concerns as well as concerns particular to the Southern District.”). 
111  United States v. Sanchez-Gomez, 798 F.3d 1204, 1209 (9th Cir. 2015), on reh’g en banc, 
859 F.3d 649, vacated, 138 S. Ct. 1532 (2018). 
112  Appellant’s Joint Opening Brief at 27, 31, United States v. Sanchez-Gomez, 859 F.3d 
649 (9th Cir. 2017) (Nos. 13-50561, 13-50562, 13-50566, 13-50571) (citing United States v. 
Howard, 480 F.3d 1005, 1008 (9th Cir. 2007)). 
113  Sanchez-Gomez, 798 F.3d at 1209. 
114  Id. at 1207. 
115  Howard, 480 F.3d at 1008; see also Sanchez-Gomez, 798 F.3d at 1208. 
116  Sanchez-Gomez, 798 F.3d at 1208 (citing Howard, 480 F.3d at 1013). 
117  Id. at 1207 (citing Howard, 480 F.3d at 1008). 
118  Id. at 1208. 
119  Id. 
120  United States v. Sanchez-Gomez, 859 F.3d 649, 649, 653 (9th Cir. 2017) (en banc), va-
cated, 138 S. Ct. 1532 (2018). 
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took the broadest application yet on this issue and announced that uniform 
shackling policies violated an individual’s due process rights.123 This opinion 
broadly held that district courts were not permitted to defer to the U.S. Mar-
shals and had to make an individual determination about each defendant’s con-
ditions justifying restraint.124 The majority clarified that this decision applied to 
all proceedings, “regardless of a jury’s presence or whether it’s a pretrial, trial 
or sentencing proceeding.”125 It emphasized Deck’s fundamental holding that 
“[c]riminal defendants, like any other party appearing in court, are entitled to 
enter the courtroom with their heads held high.”126 
The majority announced that for a court to restrain a defendant at any pro-
ceeding, that court had to justify the restraint with an explanation of the securi-
ty concerns with that defendant, then balance that security concern with the in-
dividual’s liberties, affording no deference to security personnel.127 Tracing 
much of the historical lineage that the Deck Court followed, the majority ap-
plied the longstanding principles against restraint and held that the right to be 
free from unwarranted restraint was fundamental and “ ‘has deep roots in com-
mon law.’ ”128 The court thus went beyond the Ninth Circuit panel’s decision 
and announced a new fundamental right.129 In holding that the Due Process 
Clause required courts to engage in an individualized assessment for each re-
straint decision, the en banc majority overruled United States v. Howard’s cen-
tral holding that a court could implement a routine shacking policy in an effort 
to defer to the U.S. Marshals.130 As discussed below, the en banc majority gave 
few factors for a trial court to use to determine when and what level of restraint 
is appropriate.131 
Judge Ikuta filed a dissenting opinion stating that “[t]he majority’s analysis 
is wrong at every turn.”132 In her view, Deck’s principles and core holding ap-
plied only to proceedings where the jury was present.133 She vehemently disa-
greed with the majority’s reading of the language of Deck as dicta.134 In the 
 
121  Id. at 653 (Kozinski, J., wrote the majority opinion and was joined by Thomas, C.J., and 
Reinhardt, Paez, Berzon, JJ.). 
122  Id. at 666 (Schroeder, J., concurring) (fully joining the majority but writing separately to 
“offer a brief comment about Judge Ikuta’s lengthy, well written dissent.”). 
123  See id. at 661. 
124  Id. at 666 (Ikuta, J., dissenting). 
125  Id. 
126  Id. 
127  Id. 
128  Id. at 662 (citation omitted). 
129  Recent Case, United States v. Sanchez-Gomez, 859 F.3d 649 (9th Cir. 2017) (en banc), 
cert. granted in part, 138 S. Ct. 543 (2017), 131 HARV. L. REV. 1163, 1169 (2018) (“[A] 
more restrained approach would have allowed for the same result.”). 
130  Sanchez-Gomez, 859 F.3d at 661 n.10 (overruling United States v. Howard, 480 F.3d 
1005 (9th Cir. 2007)). 
131  See infra Section III.D. 
132  Sanchez-Gomez, 859 F.3d at 684 (Ikuta, J., dissenting). 
133  Id. at 677–78 (Ikuta, J., dissenting). 
134  Id. at 678 (Ikuta, J., dissenting) (“These rationalizations do not hold water.”). 
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dissent, Judge Ikuta stated that the applicable vehicle for analysis on this issue 
was Bell v. Wolfish.135 There, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of the pre-
sumption of innocence and held that it did not protect “a pretrial detainee dur-
ing confinement before his trial has even begun.”136 For Judge Ikuta, this meant 
that the government could limit an individual’s liberties in an effort to ensure 
efficiency and security of the court.137 Thus, under the rational basis standard of 
judicial review, the Southern District’s restraint policy was reasonably related 
to the government’s legitimate security interests and ultimately constitution-
al.138 
D. What Now? The Judicial Response 
Following the en banc decision, district courts in the Ninth Circuit were 
left to interpret the ruling to the best of their abilities.139 Some resorted to less 
restrictive restraints using only leg restraints and focused on the nature of the 
proceeding and what information was available to the court at the time of the 
proceeding.140 These courts instructed judges to exercise discretion and consid-
er the “totality of the circumstances” in each case.141 This approach required 
judges to balance the defendant’s liberty interest and other due process con-
cerns with the safety and security of the court.142 Similarly, other courts closely 
followed the language of Sanchez-Gomez and performed an individualized as-
sessment for each defendant but found a defendant’s criminal history a compel-
ling reason to justify the individual’s restraint.143 Others went further and in-
structed judges to ensure that their decision to restrain an individual comported 
with the three principles outlined in Deck.144 One judge even found that alt-
 
135  Id. at 681 (Ikuta, J., dissenting). 
136  Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 533 (1979). 
137  Sanchez-Gomez, 859 F.3d at 682 (Ikuta, J., dissenting). 
138  Id. at 683 (Ikuta, J., dissenting). 
139  See In re Zermeno-Gomez, 868 F.3d 1048, 1053 (9th Cir. 2017); see also infra Section 
IV.A.; In re Zermeno-Gomez, 868 F.3d at 1052 (“Under our ‘law of the circuit doctrine,’ a 
published decision of this court constitutes binding authority ‘which must be followed unless 
and until overruled by a body competent to do so.’ ” (citations omitted) (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
140  See, e.g., Martin-Perez v. Major, No. 3:18-CV-00996-H-JLB, 2018 WL 2761734, at *6 
(S.D. Cal. June 8, 2018). 
141  See id. 
142  Id. at *5. 
143  See, e.g., United States v. Borque, No. 2:17-cr-00131-KJD-VCF, 2018 WL 1092338, at 
*2 (D. Nev. Feb. 27, 2018) (“Further, . . . this Court made its own individualized determina-
tion regarding the use of shackles prior to Defendant’s Change of Plea Hearing, stating . . . 
‘[T]he Court has reviewed the Defendant’s criminal history and finds that a compelling gov-
ernment purpose would be served and that leg shackles are the least restrictive means for 
maintaining security and order in the courtroom.’ ”); see also Memorandum from the Honor-
able Raner C. Collins, Chief Judge, U.S. Dist. Court, Dist. of Ariz., to All Court Personnel et 
al. (Aug. 4, 2017), In re Zermeno-Gomez, 868 F.3d 1048 (9th Cir. 2017) (No. 17-71867), 
ECF No. 17-2. 
144  See, e.g., Martin-Perez, 2018 WL 2761734, at *6. 
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hough a defendant was charged with murder, no compelling reason existed to 
restrain that defendant for a preliminary hearing.145 
While the Ninth Circuit offered protection for the right to be free from un-
warranted restraint, many courts found that the enforcement lacked specifici-
ty.146 This holding—although admittedly clear to some147—left many questions 
unanswered. The Ninth Circuit alluded to a set of factors in other shackling 
cases such as “evidence of disruptive courtroom behavior, attempts to escape 
from custody, assaults or attempted assaults while in custody, or a pattern of 
defiant behavior toward corrections officials and judicial authorities.”148 And 
while these factors could help a district court with its shackling decision, the 
language ultimately failed to provide a clear and effective framework that a 
court could base its decision on. 
E. Foul Ball: The Supreme Court’s Intervention 
Looming over this entire dispute was the issue of justiciability.149 It is im-
portant to note that before the issue ever reached the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals, not one of the four defendants who challenged the policy was still de-
tained.150 Three of the defendants pled guilty to their respective offenses, while 
the other defendant’s charges were dismissed.151 The en banc majority ulti-
mately determined it was capable of reaching the merits of the shackling issue 
because the appeal challenged not only the defendants’ injuries, but the policy 
itself.152 The court held that this challenge was a “functional class action[]” that 
gave the court jurisdiction to analyze the policy even though not one defendant 
was still implicated.153 This issue was the ultimate end of the road for the de-
 
145  See Tiffany DeMasters, Arizona Appeals Cuff-less Ruling, WEST HAW. TODAY (Oct. 1, 
2017, 8:53 AM), https://www.westhawaiitoday.com/2017/10/01/hawaii-news/arizona-app 
eals-cuff-less-ruling/[https://perma.cc/5DC5-KF4Y]. 
146  Maxine Bernstein, Judges Now Deciding Daily if Inmates Should Wear Shackles in 
Court, OREGONIAN (Oct. 8, 2017), https://www.oregonlive.com/portland/index.ssf/2017/10/ 
judges_now_deciding_daily_if_i.html [https://perma.cc/X488-ZF5F]. 
147  See, e.g., United States v. Bradley, No. 2:04-CR-0100-KJD-VCF, 2018 WL 493005, at 
*2 (D. Nev. Jan. 19, 2018) (“Defendant’s tunnel vision on these examples mischaracterizes 
what Sanchez-Gomez requires. The Ninth Circuit states it plainly . . .”). 
148  United States v. Sanchez-Gomez, 859 F.3d 649, 660 (9th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (citation 
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted), vacated, 138 S. Ct. 1532 (2018). 
149  See id. at 657. This Note does not offer an analysis of the justiciability and mootness is-
sues presented and argued in the course of litigation but focuses solely on the merits of the 
Ninth Circuit’s due process decision. 
150  United States v. Sanchez-Gomez, 138 S. Ct. 1532, 1536 (2018) (“Morales, Sanchez-
Gomez, and Patricio-Guzman each pled guilty to the offense for which they were charged. 
. . . The charges against Ring . . . were dismissed pursuant to a deferred-prosecution agree-
ment.”). 
151  Morales pled guilty to felony importation of a controlled substance, Sanchez-Gomez pled 
guilty to felony misuse of a passport, and Patricio-Guzman pled guilty to misdemeanor ille-
gal entry into the United States. Id. 
152  Sanchez-Gomez, 859 F.3d at 655. 
153  Id. at 658. 
Fall 2019] UNSHACKLED 389 
fendants at the United States Supreme Court, which did not reach the merits of 
the restraint policy and only granted certiorari on the jurisdictional question 
presented for review.154 
In a unanimous opinion authored by Chief Justice Roberts, the Court held 
that the Ninth Circuit did not have jurisdiction to hear the appeal because the 
issue was moot.155 Unlike the original panel of Ninth Circuit judges and the en 
banc majority who heard the case notwithstanding the defendants’ detention 
status, the Supreme Court held that reliance upon class action precedent was 
inappropriate and vacated the en banc majority decision.156 The Supreme 
Court’s decision to vacate the Ninth Circuit’s judgment had a consequence be-
yond simply reversing the holding. Because the Supreme Court vacated the 
judgment, the Court effectually stripped the Ninth Circuit’s decision of any 
precedential value, even though it only explicitly disagreed with the Ninth Cir-
cuit’s treatment of the jurisdiction issue.157 
IV. GOLDILOCKS AND THE THREE TIERS OF SCRUTINY—THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S 
IMPRACTICABLE APPROACH TO RESTRAINT 
The United States Supreme Court’s decision in Sanchez-Gomez left the 
federal judicial system in limbo. The Seventh Circuit declined to decide the is-
sue,158 while the Third Circuit recently emphasized the importance of judicial 
discretion in security decisions and declined to apply a “bright-line rule” to in-
dividualized shackling determinations.159 Although the Supreme Court identi-
fied ways that the restraint issue could come again before the Court,160 the 
 
154  See United States v. Sanchez-Gomez, 138 S. Ct. 543, 543 (2017), cert. granted. 
155  Sanchez-Gomez, 138 S. Ct. at 1542. 
156  Id. This Note will not attempt to predict the outcome of this issue should it come before 
the Supreme Court again. It is notable however that only three justices from the Deck Court 
are still present on the United States Supreme Court—Justices Breyer and Ginsburg from the 
majority, and Justice Thomas from the dissent. 
157  See O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 577 n.12 (1975) (“[O]ur decision vacating 
the judgment of the Court of Appeals deprives that court’s opinion of precedential effect, 
leaving this Court’s opinion and judgment as the sole law of the case.”). Although courts in 
the Ninth Circuit are no longer required to follow the Sanchez-Gomez approach, without a 
decision on the issue from the Supreme Court, these courts are also not prohibited from fol-
lowing the court’s guidance. Thus, this Note analyzes the Ninth Circuit’s approach in con-
trast to the Second, Third, and Eleventh Circuits’ approaches. 
158  See United States v. Henderson, 915 F.3d 1127, 1132 (7th Cir. 2019). 
159  United States v. Ayala, 917 F.3d 752, 763 (3d Cir. 2019). In Ayala, the defendant object-
ed to her restraints at her sentencing hearing. Id. at 762. The Third Circuit distinguished the 
case from Sanchez-Gomez, Deck, and another Third Circuit case because the defendant was 
not subject to a uniform restraint policy, her sentence was not capital, and no jury was pre-
sent. Id. at 762–63. 
160  The Court discussed that a defendant could use a civil suit to challenge. See Transcript of 
Oral Argument at 12–18, United States v. Sanchez-Gomez, 138 S. Ct. 1532 (2018); see also 
Sanchez-Gomez, 138 S. Ct. at 1542 (“None of this is to say that those who wish to challenge 
the use of full physical restraints in the Southern District lack any avenue for relief. In the 
course of this litigation the parties have touched upon several possible options.”). Recently, 
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Court’s silence on the shackling issue makes it unclear whether the presump-
tion applies to and protects individuals in non-jury proceedings.161 It is similar-
ly unclear what level of restraint would be appropriate without judicial review. 
What is clear however, is that a uniform federal rule is necessary for courts to 
know what conduct is permissible as it relates to restraint, and for individuals to 
know what rights the Constitution affords them in non-jury proceedings. It is 
undoubtedly impermissible then for a court to adopt a uniform restraint policy 
in violation of the individual assessment requirement, but what then is a judge’s 
discretion to restrain an individual who has limited history with the justice sys-
tem? 
The Ninth Circuit’s framework that applies the strictest level of judicial re-
view to pretrial shackling decisions, without a clear set of factors for courts to 
apply, could significantly limit a future court’s ability to restrain a potentially 
dangerous individual. While some argue that this holding was largely symbol-
ic,162 its effect could have consequences that could—as Judge Ikuta noted—
“reach into courthouses of every size and capacity.”163 In addition, an unclear 
standard by which judges can measure their conduct could lead to different and 
potentially inequitable applications of the law. For example, two defendants 
that are charged with the exact same crime and that have a very similar criminal 
history—but are in front of different judges in the same court—could have very 
different restraints imposed on them. Sanchez-Gomez thus established a frame-
work that could afford significantly different protections to individuals depend-
ing on which courtroom they end up in that week. 
Therefore, the Supreme Court should apply Deck’s core holding to afford 
individuals a right to be free from unwarranted restraint and require judges to 
make individualized assessments of defendants, but should widen the Ninth 
Circuit’s scope of factors to consider when making restraint decisions.164 This 
Part of the Note first addresses the aftermath of the Sanchez-Gomez holding 
and different judicial approaches to the issue. Next, it offers an analysis of the 
levels of judicial scrutiny and explains the inadequacy of the current due pro-
cess frameworks for this issue. Finally, it argues that while the Sanchez-Gomez 
holding is consistent with the development against restraint throughout Ameri-
can history, given the nature of certain proceedings, courts should be able to 
apply a lower level of judicial scrutiny to this decision in pretrial proceedings. 
In analyzing various scenarios under each level of scrutiny, this Part argues that 
a lower level of scrutiny offers the best balance between security and an indi-
vidual’s liberties. 
 
the Seventh Circuit also declined to address the issue of restraint in the non-jury proceedings 
as an issue of justiciability. See Henderson, 915 F.3d at 1129. 
161  See Martin-Perez v. Major, No. 3:18-CV-00996-H-JLB, 2018 WL 2761734, at *4 (S.D. 
Cal. June 8, 2018). 
162  Recent Case, supra note 129, at 1167–68. 
163  United States v. Sanchez-Gomez, 859 F.3d 649, 684 (9th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (Ikuta, J., 
dissenting), vacated, 138 S. Ct. 1532 (2018). 
164  See discussion infra Sections IV.A.3., IV.B. 
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A. Reconsidering the Appropriate Level of Judicial Scrutiny 
As explained supra, the Ninth Circuit’s decision to announce the right to 
be free from unwarranted restraint as a fundamental right, so rooted in the his-
tory of the United States that it warrants the highest level of judicial scrutiny, 
inequitably tips the scale away from courtroom security. The decisions follow-
ing Sanchez-Gomez exemplify that a lack of clear direction by the Ninth Cir-
cuit’s decision left courts to interpret these situations to the best of their abili-
ties.165 While trial courts ultimately retain the discretion to make security 
decisions in their courtrooms,166 the compelling interest requirement height-
ened the standard by which a trial court could justify restraint and took away 
any deference toward court security. If adopted, these factors have the potential 
to leave the trial courts with no basis for their decisions to justify restraint. Un-
der the Sanchez-Gomez framework, courts have little discretion to restrain an 
individual with no history of disruptive courtroom behavior or any pattern of 
defiance toward court personnel—even if that individual is on trial for a violent 
offense. While the right to be free from unwarranted restraint has developed in 
many aspects of the judicial system, this history is also focused on the safety 
and security of the court. 
Although Sanchez-Gomez no longer binds courts, the en banc court’s deci-
sion highlights the distinct approaches and levels of scrutiny that courts apply 
in restraint decisions. Courts have historically applied three levels of review in 
analyzing the Constitutional implications of laws.167 This Part of the Note will 
analyze the traditional tiers of judicial review and scrutiny for such due process 
concerns. It then offers that a new tier of scrutiny for this area of the law is nec-
essary to stabilize the balance upset by Sanchez-Gomez. 
1. Strict Scrutiny 
The compelling interest standard announced by the Ninth Circuit in 
Sanchez-Gomez is nothing new to the American judicial system. Finding its 
roots in Equal Protection jurisprudence,168 this level of judicial scrutiny affords 
the highest level of protection toward an individual’s liberties and affords the 
 
165  See supra Section III.D. 
166  See, e.g., Dietz v. Bouldin, 136 S. Ct. 1885, 1892 (2016); Wilson v. McCarthy, 770 F.2d 
1482, 1484 (9th Cir. 1985). 
167  Emma Freeman, Note, Giving Casey its Bite Back: The Role of Rational Basis Review in 
Undue Burden Analysis, 48 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 279, 282 (2013) (discussing tiers of 
scrutiny in equal protection and due process challenges). 
168  See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 762 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring) (“The 
first was not even in a due process case but one about equal protection, Skinner v. Oklaho-
ma, where the Court emphasized the ‘fundamental’ nature of individual choice about procre-
ation and so foreshadowed not only the later prominence of procreation as a subject of liber-
ty protection, but the corresponding standard of ‘strict scrutiny,’ in this Court’s Fourteenth 
Amendment law.” (citations omitted)). 
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lowest amount of deference to the government’s implementation of that law.169 
Some have even colloquially referred to this standard as “strict in theory and 
fatal in fact.”170 Courts apply this standard in all cases involving fundamental 
rights or suspect classifications.171 The Ninth Circuit’s ruling that a court must 
show a “compelling interest” before using the least restrictive means of re-
straint because of this right’s fundamental nature mirrors the language of the 
traditional strict scrutiny test. 
While this standard fits well in most shackling contexts, its application in 
non-jury proceedings, where the court and security provider have limited in-
formation about the individual’s risk to the court, produces a potentially dan-
gerous result.172 The factors that the Ninth Circuit identified as compelling—
history of disruptive behavior and pattern of escape—cannot account for a 
judge’s concerns about things like the size of her courtroom or the amount of 
security staffed at the present time. While the requisite individualized assess-
ment for each defendant allows judges to make determinations based on the in-
formation provided to them, the information reviewed in light of the factors 
provided by Sanchez-Gomez does not allow judges to restrain an individual 
based on valid security concerns.173 If freedom from unwarranted restraint in all 
proceedings remains a fundamental right, judges must be allowed to include 
other valid security concerns as compelling interests justifying restraint. This 
standard, however, is impracticable in the trial court with increasing cases, fil-
ings, and security concerns,174 and a less stringent standard should be applied. 
 
169  See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 570 U.S. 297, 316 (2013) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“This 
most exacting standard has proven automatically fatal in almost every case.” (citation omit-
ted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
170  Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A 
Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972) (citation omitted) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted). Contra Fisher, 570 U.S. at 314 (“Strict scrutiny must not be 
strict in theory, but fatal in fact.” (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
171  Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 319 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Free-
man, supra note 167, at 284 (discussing tiers of scrutiny in equal protection and due process 
challenges) (“Strict scrutiny applies to claims involving fundamental rights, such as the right 
to vote and the right to access the court system, and suspect classifications, such as race, na-
tional origin, and religion.” (citations omitted)). 
172  See United States v. Sanchez-Gomez, 859 F.3d 649, 684 (9th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (Ikuta, 
J., dissenting), vacated, 138 S. Ct. 1532 (2018). 
173  See Sanchez-Gomez, 859 F.3d at 684 (Ikuta, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Marshals Service can 
either do the impossible (predict risks based on a dearth of predictive information) or sit idly 
by and suffer an identifiable, compelling harm (violence in the courtroom).”); see also infra 
Section IV.A.3. 
174  The safety concern, based on the sheer number of cases that federal courts take on, was 
as significant of a concern in 2013 as it is today. Over the last year, the number of criminal 
filings for criminal defendants in the federal courts went up by eight percent. ADMIN. OFFICE 
U.S. COURTS., FED. JUD. CASELOAD STATS. (2018), https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics- 
reports/federal-judicial-caseload-statistics-2018 [https://perma.cc/8S5L-EUL3]. In the Ninth 
Circuit, however, the number of cases went up by sixteen percent. ADMIN. OFFICE U.S. 
COURTS, FED. JUD. CASELOAD STATS., Table D (2018), https://www.uscourts.gov/federal- 
judicial-caseload-statistics-2018-tables [https://perma.cc/N65H-7PEA]. 
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2. Rational Basis Review 
Rational basis review is the baseline standard that all laws and governmen-
tal actions that do not implicate a fundamental right must meet.175 Courts will 
uphold a governmental action challenged under this standard if it is reasonably 
related to serving a legitimate governmental interest.176 Given that this standard 
is so low, it is highly deferential to the government, and nearly all laws pass 
this constitutional muster.177 In the context of restraint, this means that a court’s 
decision to fully restrain an individual because of the U.S. Marshals’ recom-
mendation would be a sufficient justification.178 If afforded this level of protec-
tion, courts could implement district-wide policies to fully restrain any and all 
individuals—regardless of any factors signaling that they present no threat to 
security. The standard for determining the appropriate level of restraint under 
this review would be “whether [the restraint] appear[s] excessive in relation to” 
the “legitimate nonpunitive governmental purpose.”179 Like strict scrutiny, this 
standard of review is inadequate to resolve concerns about unwarranted re-
straint but swings the balance in the opposite direction toward far too much 
deference to the U.S. Marshals. 
3. Intermediate Scrutiny 
Traditionally, courts apply a third tier of scrutiny—intermediate scrutiny— 
to gender-based equal protection classifications.180 Generally, courts are appre-
hensive to apply this third tier of scrutiny to substantive due process issues 
“[i]n an effort to avoid endorsing the untrammeled exercise of judicial pow-
er.”181 There are many contexts, however, that warrant a middle-ground ap-
proach to judicial review, that finds itself somewhere in between strict and ra-
tional basis scrutiny. For example, in laws restricting abortion, the Supreme 
Court applies the undue burden test to determine whether a law that restricts 
 
175  See Freeman, supra note 167, at 283 (“Rational basis applies to equal protection claims 
that do not implicate gender, suspect classifications, or fundamental rights.” (citation omit-
ted)). There is a heightened version of this review known as “rational basis with bite,” which 
the Supreme Court has applied to laws based on pure animus toward a particular group, is 
less deferential, and presents a bigger challenge for the government to prove its purpose was 
legitimate. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 626, 632 (1996); Freeman, supra note 
167, at 279. This Note does not analyze this heightened rational basis review and instead of-
fers that intermediate scrutiny is more appropriate because of the rights at stake. See infra 
Section IV.A.3. 
176  See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 954 (5th ed. 2017). 
177  See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628 n.27 (2008) (“[A]lmost all laws[] 
would pass rational-basis scrutiny.” (citation omitted)). 
178  See Brief ex rel. Cal. State Sheriffs’ Ass’n as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 4–
5, 19–20, United States v. Sanchez-Gomez, 138 S. Ct. 1532 (2018) (No. 17-312), 2017 WL 
4404964, at *4–5, *19–20. 
179  Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 561 (1979). 
180  See 16B AM. JUR. 2d Constitutional Law § 861 (2019). 
181  Leading Cases, The Supreme Court, 1991 Term–Substantive Due Process—Intermediate 
Level Scrutiny, 106 HARV. L. REV. 163, 211 (1992). 
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access to an abortion presents “a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman 
seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus.”182 In the First Amendment context, 
the Supreme Court has applied an intermediate level of scrutiny to speech re-
strictions that are content-neutral.183 While each area of the law presents differ-
ent iterations of this approach, at its core, this level of review requires that a 
law be substantially related to an important government purpose.184 Unlike 
strict scrutiny, a court does not need to find that the government interest is 
compelling but “must characterize the objective as ‘important.’ ”185 
Although courts have not traditionally applied this level of scrutiny to fun-
damental rights, this Note argues that the language of this test appropriately 
balances court security concerns, affording some level of deference to the Mar-
shals, but still affording protection to an individual’s right to be free from un-
warranted restraint.186 In applying this level of review, the Court would likely 
need to uphold the right to be free from unwarranted restraint as a fundamental 
right, but hold that in non-jury contexts, there are exceptions justifying re-
straint. This level of review would permit a court to follow the factors identi-
fied as “compelling” by Sanchez-Gomez, but would also allow the court to 
evaluate the nature of the proceeding and size of the courtroom as “important” 
government interests.187 
This level of review would still protect an individual’s rights under Deck. 
Under the intermediate standard of review, “[t]he means used need not be nec-
essary, but must have a ‘substantial relationship’ to the end being sought.”188 
The substantial relationship element of this review would help to resolve any 
issues with the presumption of innocence and ability to communicate with 
counsel. First, it would still require the court to only restrain an individual with 
the least restrictive means to further the security interest. The substantial rela-
tionship requirement would prohibit uniform restraint policies like the policy in 
Sanchez-Gomez because even if security is an important interest, a uniform pol-
icy would not have a substantial relationship to every single defendant and eve-
 
182  Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992). 
183  See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994). 
184  See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). 
185  CHEMERINSKY, supra note 176, at 727. 
186  See Hutchins v. District of Columbia, 188 F.3d 531, 563 n.24 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (en banc) 
(Rogers, J., concurring) (“Intermediate scrutiny emerged from equal protection and First 
Amendment jurisprudence, but is also appropriate in due process cases.”); see also T. Alex-
ander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943, 969 (1987) 
(“In substantive due process cases as well, the Court has fashioned a third test, falling be-
tween ‘strict scrutiny’ and ‘mere rationality.’ This midlevel standard is the product of a re-
gime of judicial review that seeks both to protect non-textual ‘fundamental rights’ and to 
avoid criticism that the Court is operating beyond the bounds of the Constitution.”); Leading 
Cases, supra note 181, at 211 (“To guide lower courts adjudicating and litigants advancing 
substantive due process claims, the Court should introduce a middle tier of scrutiny into its 
formal two-tiered substantive due process framework.”). 
187  Cf. Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 180 (2003) (original emphasis omitted) (finding 
security as an important interest in the context of involuntary medication). 
188  CHEMERINSKY, supra note 176, at 727–28. 
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ry proceeding. If a defendant disagrees with the judge’s decision, he may still 
object on the record to his restraint for the judge to reconsider her initial deter-
mination. This standard strikes the appropriate balance because unlike the 
Sanchez-Gomez compelling interest framework, it gives judges the discretion 
they need to make more effective individualized assessments of each defend-
ant. 
B. Finding an Appropriate Middle Ground: Intermediate Scrutiny Applied 
The final Part of this Note presents two hypothetical scenarios and analyz-
es them under each standard of judicial review. It concludes that under these 
facts, intermediate scrutiny provides the best balance for an individual’s rights 
and courtroom safety and security. 
1. Defendant A 
An individual—Defendant A—is arrested for possession of marijuana with 
intent to distribute under 21 U.S.C. § 841189 and has one prior conviction for 
battery. In his time in the judicial system, he has no history of disruptive court-
room behavior. At his initial appearance, court security presents him in a small 
courtroom in District Z, in front of a U.S. Magistrate Judge. On the day of his 
initial appearance, the U.S. Marshals inform the judge that they are under-
staffed and recommend that because of the understaffing and Defendant A’s 
history of violent offenses, he be presented to the court in full restraints. Dis-
trict Z has a district-wide policy of presenting each defendant in leg restraints. 
Noted in Figure 1, Defendant A would receive different levels of restraint 
under each level of scrutiny.190 Under both the Sanchez-Gomez strict scrutiny 
approach and the approach offered by this Note, District Z’s policy of restraint 
would be unconstitutional, while under the rational basis review, it is likely 
permissible. Defendant A would likely not be able to object under rational basis 
review because so much deference is afforded to the government as the best 
decision maker for these security concerns. 
 
189  21 U.S.C. § 841 (2012). 
190  Infra Figure 1. 
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FIGURE 1 
 Strict Scrutiny Intermediate Scrutiny Rational Basis 
District-Wide Policy’s 
Constitutionality 
Unconstitutional Unconstitutional Constitutional 
Restraint of  
Defendant A 
Unconstitutional Likely Constitutional Constitutional 
Appropriate Level of 
Restraint 
None Leg Restraints Only 
Full  
Restraints191 
In a Sanchez-Gomez scenario, the magistrate judge would be unable to re-
strain Defendant A. Although the Marshals identified a serious security concern 
given the number of staff members and the defendant’s criminal history, this 
defendant does not have a “pattern” of evading law enforcement nor does he 
have any history of violent or disruptive courtroom behavior. This scenario 
highlights the ineffectiveness of this approach and that the individualized as-
sessments provided for by Sanchez-Gomez are inadequate. This scenario leaves 
the court vulnerable if the magistrate judge makes a pretrial bond decision the 
defendant does not like, or if some commotion breaks out inside of the court-
room. 
Under the intermediate scrutiny approach, the magistrate judge likely could 
restrain this defendant with leg restraints. These restraints would offer the op-
timal amount of security while still balancing Defendant A’s liberties. The 
magistrate judge could find that the Marshals’ request for full restraint is not 
substantially related to the security concern because there is a less restrictive 
manner to secure that interest. The magistrate judge has the discretion under 
this scenario to reject handcuffs alone as another less restrictive option because 
it would insufficiently prevent Defendant A’s escape.192 The court could re-
quire that the restraint be concealed from the public and that the defendant be 
brought into the courtroom before the magistrate judge enters to prevent visible 
restraint from clouding his judgment.193 
Finally, under the rational basis review standard, Figure 1 demonstrates 
that Defendant A would likely be brought into court in full restraints. Although 
full restraints are not required under this level of scrutiny, because rational ba-
sis permits the most deference to court security, the U.S. Marshals could fully 
restrain Defendant A because of the understaffing issues. At the very minimum, 
because the district-wide policy is leg restraints, Defendant A would be brought 
in for his initial appearance in leg restraints. The magistrate judge would still 
retain discretion under this scenario to reduce the amount of restraint against 
 
191  USMS POLICY DIRECTIVES, supra note 90, at 9.18(D)(2) (“To fully restrain a prisoner on 
all movements, the required equipment will consist of handcuffs, waist chains, and leg 
irons.”). 
192  See Sinclair & Fautsko, supra note 42. 
193  This practice is necessary to avoid any judicial bias from seeing the defendant in re-
straint. See People v. Best, 979 N.E.2d 1187, 1189 (N.Y. 2012) (“[J]udges are human, and 
the sight of a defendant in restraints may unconsciously influence even a judicial factfind-
er.”). 
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the Marshals’ recommendation, but only if he is so inclined. This scenario 
highlights just how little an individual’s rights are protected under this level of 
review. 
2. Defendant B 
Under this scenario, Defendant B is also arrested for possession of mariju-
ana with intent to distribute under 21 U.S.C. § 841.194 Defendant B, however, 
does not have a violent criminal history and only has one prior conviction for a 
similar drug-related offense. In her time in the judicial system, she has never 
been disruptive in the courtroom. However, she evaded police once several 
years before. At her initial appearance, she is presented in the same small court-
room, on the same day, and in District Z in front of a U.S. Magistrate Judge. 
FIGURE 2195 
 Strict Scrutiny Intermediate Scrutiny Rational Basis 
Restraint of  
Defendant B 
Unconstitutional Constitutional Constitutional 
Appropriate Level 
of Restraint 
None Leg Restraint Full Restraints 
In this hypothetical, Defendant B likely could not be restrained under the 
Sanchez-Gomez strict scrutiny framework. Because Defendant B only evaded 
police once before, she does not have a clear pattern of disruptive or evasive 
behavior. Under the Sanchez-Gomez factors, Defendant B’s conduct outside of 
the courtroom, coupled with the lack of security for the court, are still insuffi-
cient reasons to justify restraining her. While one can never fully predict an in-
dividual’s actions, not restraining Defendant B presents a serious security risk 
in case Defendant B attempts to escape or evade the U.S. Marshals. This sce-
nario, like the scenario with Defendant A, showcases the inadequacy and in-
flexibility of this framework. 
Under the lesser framework offered by this Note however, the magistrate 
judge has more discretion and ability to evaluate Defendant B’s history and the 
nature of security available to the court. Like with Defendant A, the magistrate 
judge could focus on the size of the courtroom and understaffing to choose to 
constitutionally restrain her. Although this defendant has no violent history, the 
potential security concern highlighted by the Marshals should be sufficient for 
the judge to justify a limited amount of restraint. Because of her limited crimi-
nal history, however, Figure 2 notes that the magistrate judge likely could only 
place Defendant B in leg restraints as a method that is substantially related to 
the court’s security concerns because they restrain her without affecting her 
 
194  21 U.S.C. § 841 (2012). 
195  Figure 2 omits the district-wide policy from the table because it is the same under both 
hypothetical scenarios. 
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ability to communicate with counsel196 and maintain the integrity of the court. 
To protect the defendant’s presumption of innocence, just as in Defendant A’s 
scenario, the Marshals would need to bring her into the courtroom before the 
judge. 
Just like Defendant A’s scenario, under the rational basis review of this de-
cision, the magistrate judge would likely order the Marshals to bring Defendant 
B into the court in full restraints at the Marshals’ request. Under this scenario, it 
is possible that the magistrate judge could order less restraint because Defend-
ant B does not have a violent criminal history. Under this review, however, De-
fendant B likely would not have a successful constitutional challenge to this 
decision. 
This Part of the Note indicates that although the intermediate or relaxed 
strict scrutiny approach is not without flaws, it offers the most balanced ap-
proach to the right against unwarranted restraint. This approach, however, 
should not follow the same method as the Sanchez-Gomez framework. Without 
clear markers for judges to determine what circumstances are important enough 
to justify restraint, courts applying an intermediate standard of review could po-
tentially produce a similar result as Sanchez-Gomez. Announcing clear factors 
that a court can consider under this level of review is necessary to prevent 
courts from arbitrarily enforcing this law and implementing unofficial restraint 
policies. 
CONCLUSION 
This Note contributes to the broader discussion about judicial decision-
making in pretrial and non-jury proceedings. Although this issue presents a 
contentious debate over the interpretation of precedent—both old and new—
and the extension of certain liberties to different areas of the law, it is clear that 
the current framework is untenable. While the Ninth Circuit correctly applied 
the presumptions established in Deck to all proceedings regardless of jury pres-
ence, it left many questions unanswered. This Note analyzed the history of this 
issue and identified a unifying theme throughout—shackling should be as lim-
ited as possible to prevent the diminution of an individual’s liberties unless it is 
clear that failure to restrain the defendant will pose a serious security concern 
for the court. Next, it explained the current state of the law following the Ninth 
Circuit’s split from its brethren in Sanchez-Gomez, and the unworkable frame-
work and factors it established for courts in its circuit. Finally, this Note offered 
a framework for approaching the issue of unwarranted restraint in the non-jury 
context and predicted the outcomes of various scenarios under each tier of judi-
cial scrutiny. 
While no individual’s interaction with the American judicial system is ever 
the exact same, courts should not allow that differential treatment to be because 
of an unclear rule. As the Ninth Circuit wrote: “while the phrase may be well-
 
196  See United States v. Jackson, 419 F. App’x 666, 670–71 (7th Cir. 2011) (finding that leg 
restraints did not prevent a defendant from defending himself). 
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worn, it must also be worn well: We must guard against any gradual erosion of 
the principle it represents, whether in practice or appearance.”197 
 
197  United States v. Sanchez-Gomez, 859 F.3d 649, 659 (9th Cir. 2017) (en banc), vacated, 
138 S. Ct. 1532 (2018). 
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